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 1. Introduction 
 
The promotion of good governance in its neighborhood has become one of the main 
pillars of the European Union’s foreign policy during the last decade. The European 
Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 explicitly mentions the need for the EU to 
support the development of good governance in its Eastern and Mediterranean neigh-
bourhood (European Council 2003). This objective was reiterated by the Strategy Pa-
per for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which points out that good gover-
nance constitutes one of the areas of “mutual commitment” for the new partnership 
between Brussels and the countries in its Eastern and Southern vicinity (European 
Commission 2004a: 3). Consequently, the European Commission (EC) underlined this 
aspect in its proposal for the establishment of a new financing instrument - the Europe-
an Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - for projects in states included in the 
ENP (European Commission 2004b: 12).  
 
The purpose of the present paper is to find out which strategies the EU has employed 
in order to implement this new objective of its foreign policy in the Republic of Moldova, 
as well as to identify the underlying scope of EU measures geared at promoting good 
governance in Chisinau. The chief difficulty in achieving this task derives from the signi-
ficant literature gap explaining why the EU seems to prioritise certain good governance 
export outcomes over others, while at the same time there is a plethora of contributions 
examining the success of measures proposed under the ENP and more specifically 
under the EU-Moldova Action Plan. The root of this analytical disproportion seems to 
lie in the absence of a clear long-term vision of the European Union for its Eastern 
neighbourhood, which has also been affecting the sustainability of EU involvement in 
the Republic of Moldova (European Parliament 2008: 5). Experts are therefore hard-
pressed to understand under what kind of general pattern of policy change EU measu-
res in the target state can be subsumed. A further analytical barrier lies in the concept 
of good governance per se, for which no consensual definition has been found as yet 
(Börzel et al. 2008: 7). Therefore, the definition of governance as institutionalised mo-
des of cooperation including both top-down regulation through governmental instituti-
ons and coordinated interaction of public and non-state actors which is employed in 
this paper should only be understood as serving working purposes, the choice thereof 
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 relying on one of the few papers systematically analysing the good governance appro-
aches of the EU in its Eastern neighbourhood with a focus on the process of promotion 
rather than on its outcomes (Börzel et al. 2008). 
 
While grasping the raison d’ętre of the ENP is fraught with difficulties, it seems possible 
to understand why good governance has been mainstreamed into the EU’s policy to-
wards its Eastern partners. In conjunction with the promotion of democratisation and 
the intensification of commercial relations, the export of good governance is considered 
a response to security threats such as irregular migration, organised crime or ethnic 
conflicts which risk spilling over into the EU following Eastern enlargement (Sasse 
2008: 2). Extending EU governance in its vicinity is also a tool meant to “equip the Eu-
ropean Union with a role in influencing the countries of a […] geopolitical ’grey zone’” 
(Gänzle 2007: 2). This is especially true for the post-Soviet countries, where Brussels 
needed to find a modality of counteracting Russian influence (Panainte 2008: 2).  
 
The export of good governance cannot, though, be reduced to security-related conside-
rations, not least given the fact that the concept was initially included in Brussels’ 
agenda for international development cooperation (Börzel et al. 2008: 13). Thus, the 
assumption that bad governance represents the prime motivation for the EU to try to 
promote the opposite thereof (Börzel et al. 2008: 11) needs to be taken into considera-
tion. Yet in the case of the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU, bad governance is inevi-
tably connected with the afore-mentioned security issues. For instance, bad governan-
ce in Chisinau, including key deficits such as informal institutions and corruption (ibid.), 
is intertwined with the unresolved issue of the status of the breakaway Transnistrian 
region, with political and economical elites in both the Moldovan and the Transnistrian 
capitals profiting heavily from the existence of this area of de facto legal extraterritoriali-
ty (International Crisis Group 2006: 4). Consequently, it seems safe to assert that good 
governance export in Eastern Europe has at least two motivational pillars. The intrinsic 
reason for Brussels’ good governance promotion lies in the intention to eliminate bad 
governance in the target neighbouring state, while the instrumental reason lies in the 
EU’s wish to prevent risks related to soft and hard security threats in adjacent countries 
from affecting Community interests.  
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 Understanding the logic of the European Union’s support for the development of good 
governance in its neighbourhood also involves distinguishing between the different 
aims this process may entail. Good governance export is by no means a one-way 
track. Indeed, the EU may differentiate its approach in this respect along two dimensi-
ons: the contents of good governance and the channels of influence (Börzel et al. 
2008: 9). It may choose to promote a more administrative approach of the good gover-
nance concept related to the implementation of efficient and effective decisions (Börzel 
2009), with the aim of “achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about” 
(Scharpf 1997: 19). The legitimacy of adopted measures in this case derives from the 
output thereof. However, the EU can also promote a more political understanding of the 
good governance concept, by supporting measures seeking to enhance input related 
reform goals, which ensure that political decisions represent the will of the affected 
people (Börzel 2009: 3, Börzel et al. 2008: 9). Likewise, Brussels has the choice of 
using either of two channels of influence: intergovernmental or transnational, involving 
state or non-state actors in the target state, respectively (Börzel et al. 2008: 9). There-
fore, by combining the two possible forms of the legitimacy of reform targets and the 
two channels of influence according to a model developed by Börzel et al. (2008: 9-10), 
it is possible to distinguish between four different good governance approaches: effec-
tive government which aims at implementing output-related objectives (mainly consoli-
dating the administration) through the intergovernmental channel, effective governance 
which seeks similar results, but employs the transnational channel, democratic go-
vernment which makes use of the intergovernmental channel in order to promote the 
inclusiveness of political decisions and democratic governance which attempts to en-
hance democratic quality by strengthening non-state actors.   
 
Just like the internal political context influences the strategies employed by the Com-
munity in order to promote democracy (McDonagh 2008), domestic factors – essential-
ly the degree of statehood and democracy – are expected to be responsible for the 
EU’s preference of both the contents of its governance-related goals and of the choice 
of partners in the target state (Börzel et al. 2008: 6). While some analysts warn that the 
EU “is bad at differentiation” (Popescu 2006: 8), research into the Union’s good gover-
nance export in the Caucasus states has shown that Brussels does respond to differing 
political conditions on the ground by modifying its approach towards promoting good 
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 governance according to changes in the internal setting, with the notable exception of 
countries where significant economic interests are involved (Börzel 2009: 37-38). At the 
same time, the EU does have a bias towards favouring effective policy outputs over the 
strengthening of accountability and inclusiveness (Börzel et al. 2008: 12). This 
contrasts with the American approach towards good governance, which views the pro-
motion of democracy as essential towards ensuring governance efficiency (USAID 
2002: 42).  
 
In the case of the EU, support for input related goals is only likely if the state concerned 
has strong administrative capacities (Börzel 2009: 37-38). The commitment of the 
respective third country government influences the means chosen by the EU to promo-
te democracy (Raik 2006: 33). If state institutions do not comply with European democ-
ratic standards - such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, free and fair electi-
ons, accountability or decision transparency (Popescu 2006: 13, Börzel et al. 2008: 
12), Brussels is likely to channel its support towards non-state pro-democratic consti-
tuencies, such as NGOs or independent media, by empowering them to influence pub-
lic life as a counterweight against the authoritarian government. In such a context – like 
in the case of Belarus – the EU, like other donors, needs to work secretly, since the 
government tries to control all flows of foreign aid (Raik 2006: 37). This process of 
promoting democratic governance is unlikely to occur if the domestic state leadership 
has proven both its capacity to govern effectively, and its commitment to do so legiti-
mately, in which case it is likely to be the main addressee of the EU’s good governance 
export strategy, with the aim of enhancing democratic government (Börzel et al. 2008: 
13). This approach was adopted by the EU in accession countries in the final stages of 
the enlargement process (Börzel 2009: 36). 
 
If the country concerned is marked by weak statehood, input related goals are likely to 
take a back seat, regardless of the degree of democracy. In the case of authoritarian 
regimes, the EU would be expected to attempt to involve non-state actors in order to 
implement the reforms which state institutions are not capable of tackling (Börzel et al. 
2008: 12). This is, for instance, characteristic of Brussels’ good governance approach 
in the APC countries (Börzel 2009: 36). Weak democracies are likely to be the targets 
of an effective government approach aimed at improving the capacities of state institu-
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 tions to adopt necessary governance reforms (Börzel et al. 2008: 13), as happens to 
countries which are in the early phases of the EU enlargement process (Börzel 2009: 
36). Deepening cooperation with the EU, at least in the long run and regardless of the 
existence of an accession perspective, also requires the implementation of democratic 
standards (Popescu 2006: 13).   
 
It is also important to distinguish between the three instruments used by Brussels in the 
process of good governance promotion, each of which attempts to successfully diffuse 
good governance by employing a different mechanism of influence. Political dialogue 
involves processes of social learning and persuasion, assistance targets capacity and 
institution building whereas conditionality aims to change actors’ preferences through 
positive or negative incentives (Börzel et al. 2008: 10-11). In order to strengthen de-
mocracy, the Community relies on strategies based on conditionality or socialization 
(McDonagh 2008: 142), while when seeking output related governance goals Brussels 
largely relies on technical assistance in the beginning, while later increasingly making 
use of conditionality and political dialogue (Börzel et al. 2008, McDonagh 2008). Cer-
tainly, technical assistance is also employed as a complementary instrument for de-
mocratic capacity-building. Macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, as well as 
direct budgetary aid, supplement the  spectrum of means at the EU’s disposal in order 
to extend its governance regime in its Eastern neighbourhood (Börzel et al. 2008, Eu-
ropean Commission 2006: 10).  
 
This paper represents a first attempt to examine if the general strategies of EU good 
governance promotion summarised above have been employed by Brussels in its rela-
tionship with the Republic of Moldova. In order to respond to this desideratum, after a 
review of the domestic political situation, a hypothesis can be formulated regarding the 
EU’s preference for one of its four possible good governance approaches. The paper 
then goes on to present the evolution of EU support for good governance in Chisinau 
since the inception of the TACIS programme in 1991 and until the introduction of the 
ENPI in 2007. This cross-time comparison, based on research into EU policy towards 
the Caucasus (Börzel et al. 2008), makes it possible to find out if the Community did 
indeed orient its strategy according to the Moldovan degree of statehood and democ-
racy, while concomitantly showing if and how the EU responded to changing internal 
opportunity structures in the Republic of Moldova. Finally, based on the findings regar-
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 ding EU involvement in Moldova, a few suggestions to improve the analytical frame-
work are made. 
 
 
2. The Setting – the Republic of Moldova between State Fragmen-
tation, Stalled Democratic Reforms and Economic Under-
Development 
 
The Republic of Moldova has been plagued by several crises during the past two de-
cades, both political and economical, resulting in the country often being quoted in the 
Western media as being the poorest nation in Europe. On the UN’s Human Develop-
ment Index 2007, Chisinau ranked 117th, between Vietnam and Equatorial Guinea 
(UNDP 2009: 172). The social and economic situation of the country is therefore consi-
dered one of the main challenges for the EU’s assistance policy (Umanet/Popescu 
2005: 17). Migration either to Russia or to member states of the European Union has 
become a mass phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova, with remittances of Moldo-
van guest workers accounting for 36.2 percent of GDP in 2007 - ranking 1st in the 
world, together with Tajikistan (Ratha et al. 2007: 3). While exact figures are unknown, 
the latest published estimates of the International Organisation for Migration placed the 
number of emigrants at 440,121 or 10.5 percent of the total population (IOM 2008: 15). 
Brain drain has become a defining trait of Moldovan society (Arabasa 2008: 359), as 
well as mass applications for the citizenship of neighbouring Romania, mainly in order 
to be able to travel and work legally in the EU, but at the same time breeding the 
ground for political tensions between Bucharest and Chisinau (Avram/Müller 2008: 
410-415, Avram 2009).  
 
Corruption at all levels of society has been affecting the Republic of Moldova constantly 
for the past two decades. In 2001, the country ranked 63rd on Transparency Internatio-
nal’s Corruption Perception Index, with a score of 3.1 and was thus better placed than 
all other former Soviet republics, except for the Baltic States (Transparency Internatio-
nal 2001). However, Moldova’s score worsened in the following years, resulting in a 
downgrading to 2.3 (114th place) in 2004 (Transparency International 2004). This trend 
partly reversed yet again, with Chisinau obtaining a significantly better evaluation for 
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 2009 (3.3 and rank 89) (Transparency International 2009). Still, even the latest figures 
show only relative progress and highlight the fact that corruption is rampant in the Re-
public of Moldova. The quoted data largely corresponds to the World Bank Governance 
Indicators during the same timeframe. Chisinau’s score for government effectiveness 
remained constant between 2000 and 2003 at -0.63, dropping to -0.83 in 2004 and 
finally reaching -0.76 in 2008, whereas regulatory quality was estimated at -0.43 in 
2000, -0.57 in 2004 and -0.20 in 2008 (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Control of corruption 
decreased from -0.70 in 2000 to -1.01 in 2004, to then rise again to -0.64 in 2008 (ibid.: 
98).  
 
Weak statehood has been identified by most experts as one of the main problems in 
the Republic of Moldova. Since 1992, the Eastern region of Transnistria has been func-
tioning as a de facto independent state, with Russian economic and military support 
and without international recognition. Significantly, most of Moldova’s industry is con-
centrated in Transnistria, weakening the country’s economy even further since Chisi-
nau is deprived of fiscal revenues from its renegade territory (Stratenschulte 2007: 61). 
Economic reforms are also hampered under these circumstances (Lynch 2004: 94). 
Internal politics have also been dominated by the issue of the nation’s re-unification 
(Stratenschulte 2007: 61) and the conflict in Transnistria is at least partly to blame that 
the Republic of Moldova did not receive an integration perspective into the EU 
(Grund/Sieg 2008: 403). The country has reached a level of only relative stability, 
prompting analysts to speak of a “prolonged transition” in Chisinau (Raik 2006: 34). 
While Moldova ranked lower on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 than the 
Ukraine, Georgia, and the Russian Federation, the 60th place it was accorded is better 
than in 2006, when the country was ranked 75th (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008). The sta-
teness score was 8 out of 10, lower than the Ukraine (8.8), but better than Georgia 
(6.8) and equal to Russia - by comparison, the lowest-ranked EU member state Roma-
nia had obtained 9.5 points for this criterion (ibid.), underlining the discrepancy bet-
ween the Community and its Eastern neighbourhood. 
 
Democratic progress has been slow in the Republic of Moldova, with informal political 
structures as one of the main barriers in this respect (Grund/Sieg 2008: 405). However, 
the government’s weakness has paradoxically been a cause for the country failing to 
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 fall into authoritarianism, since the state did not have the capacities to enforce such a 
trend (Raik 2006: 34). Civil society is also under-developed (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 
17). Moldova thus suffers from a double weakness, which poses a dilemma for any 
potential donor in choosing its cooperation partners for projects on the ground. The 
lack of capabilities of non-state actors have prevented these from using the comparati-
ve freedom they have been enjoying. The fact that civil society has not been able to 
assert a more offensive role may have been a cause for the government’s permissive-
ness, since its position was never under threat (Raik 2006: 34). Consequently, the 
Freedom House accorded the Republic of Moldova the status of a partially free country 
in 2008, with a political rights score of 3 and a civil liberties score of 4 points (Freedom 
House 2008). Chisinau’s results have been constant in this respect since 2003. In 
2002, the political rights situation had been evaluated more critically with only 2 points 
(Freedom House 2002). The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2008 score 
for Moldova was 6.50 out of 10 (rank 62), worse than that of the Ukraine (6.94), but 
markedly better than that of all other Caucasus states (Georgia ranked only 104th and 
had a score of 4.62). Chisinau was therefore included in the list of so-called flawed 
democracies (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 5). 
 
The complexity of the internal Moldovan political and economic context makes a pre-
diction of the EU’s good governance approach difficult to make. The economic under-
development and the resulting grave social consequences, of which migration is the 
most prominent, leads to the expectation that effective government with a focus on 
assistance and political dialogue is the most likely strategy for Brussels to adopt. The 
EU’s preference for public institution-building allows for the assumption that it is impro-
bable for civil society to be as important an addressee of European good governance 
promotion measures as the Moldovan state. However, elements of effective governan-
ce may be necessary in order to compensate for the weakness of state institutions, at 
least in some policy areas, and capacity-building for non-state constituencies may pro-
ve useful from the perspective of the Community. Nevertheless, the fact that since 
2003 Moldova has been explicitly pursuing EU integration has given Brussels a stron-
ger kind of leverage, so that a more significant role for conditionality may also be pre-
supposed, aimed especially at state actors. Given the fact that the Republic of Moldova 
has no significant economic resources, it is improbable for the EU to refrain from ma-
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 king use of conditionality, as was the case in Azerbaijan (Börzel et al. 2008). Finally, 
the comparatively better ranking of Moldovan democracy is expected to influence the 
EU’s approach by including elements of democratic government in its good governance 
promotion toolkit for Moldova. Testing these expectations is the task of the following 
two sections.    
 
 
3. Targeting State Institutions – Effective Government as a Key 
Objective of EU Involvement in the Republic of Moldova 
 
The European Union’s assistance policy in the Republic of Moldova initially followed 
the pattern of Community involvement in the other former Soviet republics, except the 
Baltic countries. Thus, Chisinau was included in the Technical Assistance for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, which started in 1991. As 
its title implies, the focus of this approach to support for the young nations lay on tech-
nical assistance and was therefore in line with development policies, rather than ap-
proaches aiming at the transformation of target states, such as PHARE 
(Umanet/Popescu 2005: 18). The main goal of TACIS in the Republic of Moldova was 
to support transition to a market economy, with aid initially centred on the agricultural 
sector (European Commission 2001: 10). Beginning with 1996, a diversification of the 
policy areas covered by TACIS took place, with the inclusion of domains such as the 
development of the private sector (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 18). Further targets of EU 
assistance were the social sphere and public administration, whereas TACIS cross-
border and regional projects addressed transport, the environment and justice and 
home affairs (European Commission 2001).  
 
As the EU meanwhile admits, the early years of TACIS assistance were characterised 
by a “top-down approach”. The intergovernmental channel was almost exclusively used 
– an approach which Brussels attributes to the need for institution-building, as well as 
to the lacking sense of ownership on the part of the national authorities involved (Euro-
pean Commission 2006). Before the formalisation of relations between Brussels and 
Chisinau within the framework of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 
(PCA), there was no scope for political dialogue (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 18). The lack 
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 of conditionality was also characteristic of TACIS, therein lying an essential difference 
when compared to EU transformation policies in other post-Socialist states (Umanet 
2004: 12). Between 1991 and 1998, further Community involvement was limited to 
macro-financial assistance, amounting to 87 million euros (European Commission 
2006: 35).  
 
The beginning of contractual relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova 
after the entry into force of the PCA in 1998 set the stage for initiating political dialogue 
and specified negative conditionality criteria related to the respect of democracy and 
human rights, as well to the principles of market economy. While the aim of supporting 
political transition was included in the PCA, the document still had a markedly strong 
focus on the economic dimension of transformation and no special programmes were 
created in order to promote civil rights (McDonagh 2008: 150). TACIS was turned into a 
financing instrument to support the implementation of PCA objectives. The priority ar-
eas for the years 2000-2003 reflected the European Union’s preference for measures 
relating to output-based legitimacy, with institutional, legal and administrative reform, 
support for the private sector and economic development and for alleviating the social 
effects of transition constituting the priorities of the corresponding TACIS National In-
dicative Programme (European Commission 2001: 10). Despite being included in the 
PCA, conditionality remained of limited practical importance, especially since Brussels 
did not establish any monitoring mechanisms (Buscaneanu 2008: 74). 
 
Consolidation of good governance, though not an objective of the PCA, was discussed 
in other documents related to the EU’s policy towards Moldova. Thus, in the Country 
Strategy Paper for 2002-2006, strengthening good governance is explicitly pointed out, 
the text stressing that it should be one of the results of the envisaged political dialogue 
under the PCA framework and directly linking it to the fight against corruption and 
money laundering. Furthermore, the same document also underlines the necessity of 
ensuring good governance as a precondition for the improvement of the investment 
climate and for producing economic growth (European Commission 2001: 13-14). The 
amended TACIS National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 further details the objective 
of assisting the Moldovan government in applying good governance, specifying that 
this should result in the creation of an anti-corruption policy and programme, in the de-
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 velopment of an anti-money laundering regime, in the improvement of the business 
environment, as well as of information for poverty assessment and of environmental 
awareness (ibid.: 15). Significantly, the implementation of assistance for improving 
good governance was tied not only to the conditionality mentioned in the PCA, but also 
on the commitment of the Moldovan government and parliament to pass and imple-
ment the necessary legislation (ibid.: 16).  
 
This overt promotion of good governance by the Community was – in contrast to the 
first years of EU assistance in the Republic of Moldova – no longer typical of Brussels’ 
policies in CIS states, given the fact that, for instance, good governance only explicitly 
became part of the agenda for the Caucasus republics when the European Neighbour-
hood and Partnership Instrument was introduced (Börzel et al. 2008: 16). The inclusion 
of good governance in the list of specific objectives to be covered by TACIS also shows 
that the EU had not been reluctant to differentiate between post-Soviet partner coun-
tries, thus contradicting one of the main critiques of the so-called “PCA method” which 
was accused of “folding it [the Republic of Moldova, A.A.] together with states that have 
different backgrounds, compositions and prospects” (Lynch 2005: 95). On the contrary, 
the Moldovan example serves to prove that the EU did react to the more favourable 
domestic political opportunity structure. As quoted above, at the beginning of the cur-
rent decade, Moldova had obtained better ratings on corruption perception and on gov-
ernment effectiveness than the other CIS members, therefore prompting the EU to 
promote more ambitious targets such as good governance. The exclusive focus on 
state actors as addressees of measures in this regard confirms the assumption that 
Brussels tends to resort to non-state actors only when government institutions do not 
yield the outputs expected by the EU (Börzel et al. 2008).  
 
While the explicit objectives related to the strengthening of good governance all aim at 
effectiveness, rather than inclusiveness, the EU did allocate a modest sum for projects 
in the Republic of Moldova under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), which amounted to 0.2 million euros in 2000 and 0.47 million euros in 
2001 (European Commission 2006: 35). However, the development of civil society was 
also an objective of the TACIS National Indicative Programme 2002-2003, which aimed 
at enhancing the contribution of non-state actors in the social and environmental 
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 sphere and at capacity-building for NGOs active in these fields (European Commission 
2001: 17-18). The strengthening of citizens’ contribution to democracy was one of the 
objectives of the EU’s Tempus programme for Moldova, with higher education estab-
lishments as the main partner institutions (ibid.: 18). These elements of EU policy to-
wards Chisinau show that while effective government clearly remained the main strat-
egy in order to promote good governance, Brussels did cautiously make use of the 
transnational channel, while at the same time attempting to consolidate the input-
dimension of Moldovan democracy. Moreover, by involving NGOs in the social and 
environmental sectors, the EU also included an element of effective governance in its 
good governance approach for the Republic of Moldova. 
 
 
4.  Targeting Civil Society – Elements of Effective and Democratic 
Governance in the EU’s Approach towards the Republic of 
Moldova after 2003 
 
The political context in Chisinau radically changed between 2001 and 2003. At the be-
ginning of 2001, the Party of Communists (PCRM) under Vladimir Voronin had ob-
tained an unprecedented victory in Moldovan elections, winning 71 seats in Moldova’s 
101-member legislative. At first, the new government advocated closer relations with 
Moscow and even considered joining the Russia-Belarus-Union. Government effec-
tiveness decreased, one of the most visible results thereof being the suspension of 
payments by the International Monetary Fund under its programme for Moldova, which 
had been included in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (European Commis-
sion 2004c: 19). Corruption perception indicators also worsened, as underlined in sec-
tion 2 by the marks accorded to the Republic of Moldova by Transparency Interna-
tional. 
 
A significant political development in the Republic of Moldova occurred only late in 
2003, when Voronin announced European integration as the strategic objective of his 
country’s foreign policy. While this new diplomatic vector has been dismissed by many 
local experts as electoral rhetoric (Panainte 2008: 2), Western analysts point out that 
Chisinau’s approach towards EU integration is mainly reactive, rather than proactive 
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 (European Parliament 2008: 13). Indeed, the reversal of the initial foreign policy strate-
gy of the PCRM government was mainly due to the failed implementation of the so-
called Kozak Memorandum aimed at solving the conflict in Transnistria by creating a 
federation with three federal subjects (Moldova proper, the autonomus region of Ga-
gauzia and Transnistria) and stipulating the presence of a contingent of Russian troops 
in order to guarantee its provisions – a plan ultimately rejected by Voronin. The factor 
of the new orientation of Chisinau’s foreign policy also needs to be taken into conside-
ration as a decisive element of the changing Moldovan domestic opportunity structure.  
 
Against the backdrop of the already inaugurated European Neighbourhood Policy and 
of the EU-Moldova Action Plan being in the final phase of negotiation, the Country 
Strategy Paper 2004-2006 and the corresponding National Indicative Programme 
2005-2006 provided for a slight shift from the Community’s strong focus on effective 
government, in response to the weakening of the Moldovan state, while it still mainly 
targeted state institutions. A visible reaction of the EU, given the worsening situation on 
the ground, lies in the fact that good governance as a concept disappeared from the list 
of priorities for the years 2004-2006 (European Commission 2004c: 20-22).  Instead, 
combating corruption and money laundering, together with the fight against irregular 
migration and human trafficking, were subsumed under the heading “co-operation in 
Justice and Home Affairs” – one of seven priorities of both the EU-Moldova Action Plan 
and of the Country Strategy Paper 2004-2006 (ibid.). The promotion of cooperation 
between judicial and law enforcement bodies on the one hand and NGOs specialising 
in these fields on the other hand became an explicit target (ibid.: 27). At the same time, 
state institutions, ranging from the parliament to the national border guard or customs 
services, continued to be the principal partners for the EU. Assistance remained a key 
instrument for supporting both public institutions and non-state actors in promoting the 
fight against corruption, money laundering and human trafficking.  
 
Other objectives formerly linked to the promotion of good governance were indirectly 
addressed to by other priority areas of the Country Strategy Paper 2004-2006. This 
was especially the case for the target of contributing to the economic and social reform 
and development of the country. The TACIS National Indicative Programme provided 
for an enhanced role for NGOs working to contribute to the alleviation of the social 
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 consequences of transition by supporting organisations assisting vulnerable groups 
such as single parent families, the elderly or the disabled, through capacity-building 
measures, while also promising technical assistance to the government aimed at re-
ducing poverty (ibid.: 37). Strengthening civil society was identified as an objective per 
se, with the National Indicative Programme stressing that NGOs “can play an important 
part in social transition and address at community level social problems that might oth-
erwise be overlooked” (ibid.: 29). Local authorities were also included on the list of po-
tential beneficiaries of capacity-building (ibid.: 30). The significance of these new ele-
ments of the Community’s good governance approach for the Republic of Moldova is 
highlighted by the fact that the choice of enlarging the spectrum of addressees of sup-
port from Brussels occurred despite the fact that the non-governmental sector was un-
derdeveloped at the time, thus posing an additional challenge for the EU’s assistance 
policy (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 17). However, the weakness of state institutions will 
have left Brussels with no other alternative than to try a two-pronged strategy of pro-
moting good governance by adding the transnational channel to the already employed 
intergovernmental one.  
 
Under the third priority area – political dialogue and reform – provisions were also 
made for an enhanced role for NGOs, the reports of which were to be taken into con-
sideration when monitoring reforms regarding the impartiality and independence of the 
judicial system (European Commission 2004c: 25). The same holds true for the priority 
area relating to transport, energy, telecommunications and the environment, with Brus-
sels considering that NGOs can make a contribution in the field of ecology (ibid.: 30). 
However, in both cases state actors were clearly the priority targets for EU good gov-
ernance promotion, which specified the need for legislative approximation and adminis-
trative reforms (ibid.: 24).      
 
Democratisation had also suffered serious setbacks between 2001-2003, with the 
PCRM-dominated parliament passing a number of legislative acts resulting in direct or 
indirect curbs on the exercise of political and civil rights (McDonagh 2008: 148). The 
TACIS National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 reflects the fact that the EU’s per-
ception of the degree of democracy in the Republic of Moldova had changed. Various 
forms of support were to be employed in order to strengthen democracy and ensure 
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 the respect for human rights (European Commission 2004c: 24). Furthermore, despite 
the focus on output-related objectives for the involvement of non-state actors, the ne-
cessity of supporting NGOs promoting democracy and human rights was mentioned, 
as well as of associations of independent media (ibid.: 29-30). These elements of de-
mocratic governance – like the effective governance strategy described above – repre-
sented a significant change from the previous concentration on effective government in 
the Community’s approach towards the Republic of Moldova. Last, but not least, the 
Country Strategy Paper 2004-2006 and the TACIS National Indicative Programme 
2005-2006 provided for the use of the twinning instrument for the first time in the rela-
tions between Brussels and Chisinau (ibid.), thus supplementing the assistance-based 
strategy by using an instrument that may also involve processes of social learning. 
 
 
5.  Targeting Conflict Resolution, Strengthening Trade and  
 Combating Corruption – the EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005-08 
  
The Republic of Moldova belonged to the “first wave of ENP countries” (Popescu 2006: 
1) to conclude an Action Plan with the European Union, together with the Ukraine, the 
document being adopted by the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council in February 2005. 
Arguably, this new step represented the most radical change in the relationship be-
tween Brussels and Chisinau. The Republic of Moldova was thus “invited to enter into 
intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU” and for the 
first time conflict prevention and conflict resolution were defined as a commonly-shared 
responsibility (EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005: 1). Indeed, the failed Kozak Memoran-
dum - which would have endorsed a solution to the Transnistrian conflict favouring the 
geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in the region – acted as a catalyst for 
renewing and intensifying EU engagement in the Republic of Moldova (Grund/Sieg 
2008: 404). The European Union explicitly placed the resolution of the Transnistrian 
issue at the core of the new document. Given the direct link between the “frozen con-
flict” and the weakness of the Moldovan state, the implementation of measures aiming 
to overcome the former or reduce its negative impact can be considered a strategy to 
promote good governance by consolidating Moldovan statehood. Not only was the con-
flict between Chisinau and Tiraspol identified as one of the seven priorities of the Ac-
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 tion Plan (the others including political dialogue and reform, economic and social re-
form, regulatory reforms, justice and home affairs, transport, energy and research and 
development, as well as people-to-people contacts), but it penetrated the other target 
areas too. Thus, support for constitutional reform as a prerequisite for a settlement of 
the Transnistrian issue was mentioned as the first goal of the chapter on political dia-
logue, whereas the development of border management was to include measures 
aimed at the Transnistrian sector of the Republic of Moldova’s border with the Ukraine 
(EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005). Brussels showed its willingness to address a conflict it 
had hitherto largely ignored, taking advantage of the fact that Chisinau’s foreign policy 
had turned away from its Moscow-based orientation which had forced Voronin to look 
for support in Brussels in the quest for a lasting settlement of the Transnistrian ques-
tion.  
 
The most visible support from the EU yet again came in form of technical assistance 
through the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at the boundary between 
the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine, including the Transnistrian sector, which is 
meant to assist the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in combating smuggling and 
other forms of cross-border criminality and thus ensures that only Transnistrian prod-
ucts registered in Chisinau can be exported (Grund/Sieg 2008: 404). Thus, the mission 
had the effect of strengthening Moldovan statehood (Stratenschulte 2007: 62). The 
deployment of the border guards and customs officers from EU member states who 
assist their Moldovan and Ukrainian counterparts is also aimed at combating corruption 
on the ground (EUBAM 2006: 13), therefore further contributing to the consolidation of 
the statehood in both countries.  Moreover, the EU and the Republic of Moldova 
agreed on the need to involve civil society and to promote democratic values and re-
spect for human rights as a further means of contributing to the settlement of the 
Transnistrian issue (EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005: 10). The effective government ap-
proach used in the case of EUBAM was therefore complemented by an – albeit modest 
– element of democratic governance. While the outreach of the latter is certainly limited 
due to the complexity of the geopolitical context, it responds to the necessity pointed 
out by Moldovan experts to involve non-state actors from the unrecognised republic 
(Popescu 2006: 14). Furthermore, a democratised Moldova is more likely to appeal to 
the Transnistrian population (Raik 2006: 35), which until now has been reluctant to 
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 support steps to overcome the divide along the Dnestr river. The TACIS National In-
dicative Programme 2005-2006 had also pointed out that in case of a successful reso-
lution of the conflict, Transnistrian civil society would have to be engaged thereafter, 
besides the necessary steps to ensure democratic reforms (European Commission 
2004: 19).  
 
Whereas the cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Moldova regarding a 
possible solution for the Transnistrian issue has primarily been based on the instrument 
of assistance, the main mechanism upon which the EU-Moldovan Action Plan is based 
is the incentive of closer ties between Brussels and Chisinau depending “on the degree 
of Moldova’s commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly 
agreed priorities” and promising the Republic a “stake in the EU’s internal market” and 
the “further development of mechanisms for political dialogue” (EU-Moldova Action 
Plan 2005: 1-2). It has been argued that the vagueness of these incentives may prove 
to be an impediment for the efficiency of EU conditionality (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 21). 
However, it is imperative to differentiate between economic or even “technical” condi-
tionality on the one hand and political conditionality on the other, since, for instance, 
the EU did spell out its trade-related incentives for Chisinau much more than its offer 
for enhanced political relations. Thus, Moldova was promised Autonomous Trade Pref-
erences, if capable of implementing a system of efficient control of the origin of goods 
(EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005: 4). The TACIS National Indicative Programme 2005-
2006 had also stipulated that assistance would be targeted at consolidating the Moldo-
van administration and at the approximation of legislation aimed at setting the stage for 
additional trade concessions by the EU (European Commission 2004c: 24). The Re-
public of Moldova proved to be successful in reforming its customs system and in the 
control of its origin of goods and was therefore granted Autonomous Trade Preferences 
in 2008 – a result of EU positive conditionality (Buscaneanu 2008: 74-75). Furthermore, 
in matters related to output-related governance objectives, Chisinau went even further 
than EU conditionality, by introducing the legal requirement that all laws comply to the 
acquis communautaire in what some specialists have called a process of “voluntary 
adaptation” by political elites in Chisinau to EU standards and norms (Verdun/Chira 
2008: 7).  
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 Another area where the EU could put forward a strong incentive was the prospect of 
visa facilitation as part of cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. The ab-
sence of the explicit prospect of more freedom of travel had prompted initial misgivings 
about the ENP in the affected countries (Munteanu 2008: 398). In order to ease travel 
for certain categories such as businesspeople, students or journalists, Brussels had 
tied the issue to the conclusion of a Readmission Agreement alongside the Visa Facili-
tation Agreement (Litra 2009: 11-12). By the end of 2007, both documents had been 
signed, constituting – along with the Autonomous Trade Preferences – one of the most 
important elements of progress in relations between the EU and the Republic of 
Moldova (Grund/Sieg 2008: 404). While visa facilitation is not linked to good govern-
ance, the readmission agreement does force the Moldovan government to improve its 
migration management capacities, which was one of the objectives of the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan and which undoubtedly represents an essential element of good govern-
ance, especially in the context of the country’s flow of illegal or semi-legal migration. 
Both in the case of the trade preferences, and in the case of the readmission agree-
ment, the obvious target of EU conditionality were Moldovan state institutions such as 
the customs or border guard service, with the role of civil society actors – in the case of 
the latter – remaining at the level foreseen in the TACIS National Indicative Programme 
2005-2006, as quoted earlier. Output-oriented objectives aimed at regulatory reform 
thus proved to be achievable through concrete EU positive conditionality. As quoted in 
the second chapter of this paper, the World Bank’s assessment of regulatory quality 
had reached -0.20 by 2008, compared to -0.57 in 2004.  
 
As in the Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, the fight against corruption and money 
laundering were included in the political dialogue and reform component of the EU-
Moldova Action Plan. Furthermore, combating corruption was declared a precondition 
for improving the business climate (EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005). Later Community 
progress reports on the Action Plan even stressed that the success of the Moldovan 
authorities’ anti-corruption strategy was essential for achieving all the objectives of the 
document in the field of political reform (European Commission 2008: 4), thus underlin-
ing the strong link between corruption and guaranteeing the rule of law or the inde-
pendence of the judiciary as well. Furthermore, cooperation with civil society on the 
issue of combating corruption was to be further developed (EU-Moldova Action Plan 
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 2005: 6). Just like in the TACIS National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, the EU was 
most probably reacting to the worsening corruption perception indicators for Moldova. 
Three years later, the EU – while applauding certain progress made in the field – not 
only underscored the need for more substantial steps forward, but also once again in-
dicated that the problem had to be tackled in conjunction with civil society (European 
Commission 2008: 4). Corruption remained one of the most sensitive issues in EU-
Moldovan relations even after the corruption perception ratings of the country improved 
in 2008, with Brussels requesting the allocation of more resources and the adoption of 
secondary legislation to ensure that anti-corruption measures put in place by Chisinau 
were efficiently implemented (European Commission 2009: 4). The fact that the Repub-
lic of Moldova was constantly lagging behind Brussels’ expectations did trigger EU 
conditionality. The fact that the EU-Moldova Action Plan was extended by a year in 
February 2008, instead of starting negotiations on a new agreement between the EU 
and its Eastern neighbour has been attributed to the lack of progress attested by the 
EU in several areas (Lupan 2010).  Thus, the promised deepening of political relations 
was postponed.    
 
However, while Moldova was indeed hoping to start negotiations for a new document to 
replace the PCA (Grund/Sieg 2008: 404), it is by no means certain that compliance 
with EU benchmarks in the area of corruption would have necessarily led to deeper 
political relations with Brussels. Indeed, the lack of clarity regarding the political finality 
of the Republic of Moldova’s European future may have been to blame for the modest 
progress Chisinau made in this respect. Other objectives related to political dialogue 
and reform, such as ensuring freedom of the media and freedom of expression, as well 
as the strengthening of institutions supposed to guarantee the rule of law – explicit pri-
orities in the EU-Moldova Action Plan - have also hardly been achieved (ibid.: 406). 
The European Union has been reluctant to link economic and political conditionality, 
i.e. to link more concrete “carrots” such as the Autonomous Trade Preferences to pro-
gress in democratic freedoms  (Buscaneanu 2008: 77), thus confirming that the ENP is 
a policy which allows traditionally Eurosceptic actors to selectively follow the path of 
rapprochement with the EU (Sasse 2008: 4). The Moldovan Party of Communists with 
its initial orientation towards Russia and its failure to implement democratic reforms 
appears to fit this description quite well, choosing to focus only on measures that were 
 21
 not about to challenge its position in political life in Chisinau. Furthermore, under the 
heading on people-to-people contacts in the EU-Moldova Action Plan, the focus is on 
cultural and educational cooperation, without reference to the potential of such projects 
to enhance democracy and with only one brief mention of the goal to consolidate civil 
society cooperation (EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005: 42-43). 
 
Political dialogue on issues related to the input dimension of good governance did nev-
ertheless take place, with the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee play-
ing a prominent role in this respect. Problems such as the necessity of implementing 
institutional reforms in the area of rule of law or freedom of speech, as well as on free-
dom of the media were addressed, while concomitantly stressing that in preparation for 
the parliamentary elections in 2009, the Moldovan government needed to ensure “a 
level-playing field for all political parties” (EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee 2008: 4). Furthermore, in cases of blatant cases of disregard for fundamen-
tal freedoms, the EU Heads of Mission in Chisinau reacted in two joint statements dur-
ing 2008 (European Commission 2009: 5), publicly “shaming” the Communist govern-
ment. Such messages had already been successful in 2003, when the PCRM-led gov-
ernment had attempted to gain control of public television (McDonagh 2008: 156).   
 
The lack of capacities of state institutions to cope with requirements such as the draft-
ing of reports on the implementation of the Action Plan also led the government to co-
operate with NGOs in preparing such documents. Progress regarding the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan was monitored by two NGO coalitions in Chisinau and in some cases of 
initial governmental non-compliance with the objectives therein, public pressure by 
non-state actors was a factor responsible for bringing the authorities back on track 
(Popescu 2006: 7). Thus, while the EU-Moldova Action Plan’s input-related objectives 
were less actively pursued by the Community, NGOs were able to strengthen their po-
sition and in so doing contributed to the inclusiveness of the reform process. One last-
ing result of this enhanced role for civil society was the inauguration of the National 
Council of Participation in 2008, meant to provide the government with the expertise of 
non-state actors in formulating and assessing public policies (European Commission 
2009: 6).  Such side effects show that the EU cannot always control the impact of its 
good governance approach on the constellation of state and non-state actors on the 
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 ground. Despite its focus on the Moldovan government in the Action Plan, the result at 
the national level was a mixture of effective government and effective governance, al-
beit with a much stronger role of the former. 
 
 
6.  Rethinking Good Governance – the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument in the Republic of Moldova 
 
With the advent of the introduction of the new European Neighbourhood and Partner-
ship Instrument for the ENP countries, good governance became an explicit objective 
not only in the relation between Brussels and Chisinau, but for the entire region (Börzel 
et al. 2008: 16). The Republic of Moldova does, however, stand out, since among the 
Eastern neighbours of the Community, it is scheduled to receive the greatest amount of 
funding per capita between 2007 and 2010 (48 euros), surpassing the Ukraine – con-
sidered more “advanced” in its quest for closer ties with the EU (Stratenschulte 2007: 
63) – and the Caucasus republics (European Parliament 2008: 8). By the time the 
ENPI came into force, improvements in governance had already become visible in the 
Republic of Moldova and in the following year, indicators for corruption perception, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality (as quoted in section 2) proved that 
Chisinau, while still far from approaching the level of EU member states, had been 
making progress.  As Moldovan experts readily admitted, the Action Plan had provided 
“a favourable framework for strengthening government structures” (Osoian 2007: 22). 
The EU responded to this development by continuing to focus on state institutions as 
the main targets of good governance promotion and on output-related objectives. 
Technical assistance was supplemented by twinning (European Commission 2009), 
whereas the ENPI for the Republic of Moldova contains conditionality primarily relating 
to the disbursement of funds for the Food Security Programme (Litra 2009: 13).  
 
The Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 identifies support for good governance and 
democratic development as the first of three priority areas for ENPI national allocations 
for Chisinau and specifies four corresponding sub-priorities: public administration re-
form and public finance management, rule of law and judicial reform, human rights, civil 
society development and local government, education, science and people-to-people 
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 contacts (European Commission 2006: 18). Thus, apparently there is a new balance 
between output-related targets and objectives related to enhancing the inclusiveness of 
decision-making. However, data from the progress reports of the European Commis-
sion in 2008 and 2009 show that this apparent novelty in the EU’s approach should 
rather be understood as having declaratory character. Under the first ENPI Annual 
Programme for the country, the focus of assistance programmes lay on the social sec-
tor (priority area 3), which amounted to 21 million euros of budget support out of a total 
of 40 million euros of EC funding (European Commission 2009: 22), while the only 
prominent area to receive funding under the good governance heading was border 
management, including EUBAM-flanking support (European Commission 2008: 18). 
Support for border management continued in the following year, with 10 million euros 
out of 62.3 million – the greater part of the rest being dedicated to reforming the health 
system (European Commission 2009: 22).  
 
Nevertheless, in order to support civil society contacts between Chisinau and Transnis-
tria, a project to build up relations between non-state actors on both sides of the Dnestr 
was also financed (European Commission 2009: 22). In the case of the latter, however, 
this is not to be attributed to the EU’s prioritising non-state actors as such, but rather to 
the impossibility of Brussels to finance any measure involving the unrecognised au-
thorities in Tiraspol. Therefore, it seems relatively clear that Brussels has been main-
taining its effective government orientation already present in the EU-Moldova Action 
Plan.  However, it should be mentioned that it is too early to evaluate Brussels’ good 
governance approach under the ENPI, since the programme has only been functional 
since 2007 and an in-depth analysis thereof cannot be completed at this time. 
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The present paper represents an attempt at a comprehensive overview of the Euro-
pean Union’s good governance approach for the Republic of Moldova. It has been able 
to show that while Brussels started its promotion of good governance in Chisinau 
mainly through technical assistance under the TACIS framework, thus including the 
country in the group of post-Soviet states for which European integration was not en-
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 visaged. In choosing effective government as a good governance export strategy, the 
European Union was reacting to the multitude of social and economic problems the 
Republic of Moldova faced in the 1990s. Despite these hardships, the Moldovan gov-
ernment received better ratings on corruption perception, government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality than its CIS neighbours, prompting the Community to identify 
good governance as an explicit objective of its policy towards Chisinau in late 2001 in 
its Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, whilst at the same time remaining true to its 
principle of primarily supporting state institutions. At this point, political dialogue – first 
included in the PCA - was also upgraded, complementing the focus of the EU on tech-
nical assistance. In setting the ambitious target of good governance for Moldova, the 
EU showed its capability of differentiating between post-Soviet states and of respond-
ing to a more favourable domestic political environment in Chisinau, when compared – 
for instance – to the Caucasus countries, where good governance only much later be-
came an explicit goal of Community assistance (Börzel et al. 2008: 16) While the lack 
of monitoring mechanisms precluded an enhanced role for conditionality as spelt out in 
the PCA (Buscaneanu 2008: 74), the above-mentioned goal was linked to the Moldo-
van authorities’ readiness to draft and implement required legislation, including in the 
areas of combating corruption and money laundering (European Commission 2001: 15-
16).   
 
The takeover of power by the Communist government and the decreased ratings of 
standard statehood indicators provide the evidence that the European Union shifts its 
focus from effective government to an approach including elements of effective gov-
ernance as soon as the state institutions it has been cooperating with are no longer 
capable of producing the outputs desired by the European Union. The Country Strategy 
Paper 2004-2006 includes provisions on the necessity of NGOs tackling social issues 
which the government alone may not be able to handle, while at the same time indicat-
ing a more pronounced role for non-state actors in promoting the inclusiveness of po-
litical decisions, in response to the PCRM’s poor record in this respect. Furthermore, 
non-state actors received a stake in measures to combat corruption, money laundering 
and border management, including human trafficking (European Commission 2004c). 
Technical assistance remained the main instrument employed by Brussels, though 
twinning was also introduced at this time.   
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The EU-Moldova Action Plan brought about what experts have been calling “condition-
ality lite” (Sasse 2008), by offering primarily economic incentives for further output-
related reforms, while giving the Moldovan government the opportunity to progress 
selectively. The pro-European foreign policy thereof after 2003 was a catalyst for even 
more legal approximation took place than demanded by Brussels (Verdun/Chira 2008: 
7-8). Economic conditionality with the concrete “carrot” of better access to the EU mar-
ket for Moldovan products was successful in encouraging Chisinau to modernise its 
customs service, while the issue of free travel led to the concluding of a Readmission 
Agreement, which formed a package with a much-expected (by the Moldovan side) 
Visa Facilitation Agreement. The EU in these cases showed a thorough understanding 
of the domestic opportunity structure, especially since the PCRM government was 
hard-pressed to show tangible results of its new foreign policy orientation. Therefore, it 
is understandable that the EU reverted to the effective government approach. How-
ever, indirectly the EU also favoured civil society actors, because Moldovan state insti-
tutions were dependant on the assistance thereof in monitoring progress with meeting 
EU benchmarks. 
 
Concomitantly, the Community proved that its motivation to promote good governance 
was not inclusively intrinsic, but also guided by security fears (Börzel et al. 2008: 11 
and Sasse 2008: 2 respectively). The risk of a solution to the separatist conflict in 
Transnistria best serving the Russian Federation’s geopolitical interests was an impor-
tant factor in the EU’s decision to send the EUBAM mission to supervise the border 
between the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine, while at the same time strengthen-
ing Chisinau’s leverage over the renegade region and thus Moldovan statehood per se 
(Stratenschulte 2007: 62). Border management also remained a focus of the good 
governance approach under the ENPI framework. The mission helped stem corruption 
in the border agencies, while this still remained a social phenomenon insufficiently 
tackled by the authorities in Chisinau. In response to the reluctance of the Communist-
led government to effectively fight against corruption, the EU emphasised the need to 
involve civil society as well, thus reiterating its approach of only resorting to the latter 
when the effective government strategy does not show results.   
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  Political dialogue on input-related issues such as the democratic conduct of elections 
or independent media did exist, though at a lower intensity, thus confirming the as-
sumption that elements of democratic government may also be promoted by Brussels, 
given Moldova’s comparatively good democracy ratings in the CIS context. Moreover, 
in reaction to the period 2001-2003, when Chisinau had lapses into authoritarianism, 
the EU reacted in its Country Strategy Paper 2004-2006 with elements of democratic 
governance, by pointing out the possibility of funding non-state actors to promote inclu-
siveness and transparency, including an enhanced role for local authorities (European 
Commission 2004c: 29-30). However, the EU’s bias towards effectiveness has preven-
ted democratic government of becoming the dominant approach for good governance 
export.  
 
The present paper has therefore shown that all the hypotheses in the introduction were 
supported by the empirical data. However, there are two aspects which cannot be ac-
counted for only with the help of the theoretical model adopted. While good governance 
may be an objective of the EU, the ENPI funding distribution has shown that there may 
be a significant discrepancy between declaratory priorities and projects actually recei-
ving funds. The apparently balanced list of sub-priorities related to good governance 
which refers to both output- and input-based areas, the EU’s allocation policy has 
clearly favoured the former. Quantitative analysis criteria might therefore be a necessa-
ry supplement to the largely qualitative theoretical framework employed, in order to 
shed more light on the priorities of Brussels on the ground, including on its good gover-
nance promotion approach. At the same time, Chisinau receives more aid per capita 
under the ENPI framework than all other countries eligible, except for the Palestinian 
Authority (European Parliament 2008: 7). Thus, the EU differentiates its good gover-
nance approach among ENP countries based on quantitative criteria as well, by provi-
ding varying sums per capita for the implementation of measures related to improving 
governance. It seems important to understand if the funding provided reflects a res-
ponse towards the domestic political context or if it is related to a specific good gover-
nance export strategy, i.e. if, for instance, effective government requires more financial 
support than democratic government.   
 
 27
 A further analytical limitation is to be found in the linkage between statehood and re-
gime type and EU good governance export strategies. The impact of membership aspi-
rations of the various ENP countries may have to be taken into account as a variable 
separated from a broadly defined domestic opportunity structure. This is due to the fact 
that once “an ENP country with membership aspirations does indeed meet the EU’s 
criteria and objectives […] the EU will find it very hard to deny membership on substan-
tive grounds” (Sasse 2008: 3). Whilst the EU is expected to react to the political context 
of a particular neighbouring state (Börzel et al. 2008: 9, McDonagh 2008), it remains 
questionable whether Brussels is likely to promote good governance to the extent that 
the country in question may eventually qualify for membership. This is especially rele-
vant when taking into account the preference Brussels has been showing for promoting 
stronger statehood, i.e. the capacity of public institutions to carry out regulatory functi-
ons and to implement policies (Börzel et al. 2008: 11). While democratic criteria in ENP 
states remain problematic, full EU membership is bound to remain out of the question - 
a convenient result for Brussels, at least until a long-term engagement strategy for its 
Eastern neighbours with a clear finality is agreed upon. This aspect may be dismissed 
as cynical, yet its potential impact on the choice of priorities in the process of good go-
vernance export cannot entirely be overlooked. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, 
it has been pointed out that the opposing trade interests of Brussels and Chisinau have 
led to the paradoxical effect of the EU providing the latter with balance of payment lo-
ans necessary as a result of trade barriers imposed by the Community on its neighbour 
– instead of liberalising trade (Umanet/Popescu 2005: 22). It may therefore be neces-
sary to understand if the EU’s lack of ambition in promoting input-related governance 
progress is also related to its reluctance to accept the idea of EU Moldovan members-
hip. These problems underline the need for further research on further factors influen-
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